




The purpose here is to consider some significant gaps in the theoretical bases with which we seek to under-
stand international conflict - either at the level of non-military hostility or at that of actual warfare. The in-
centives behind both levels of conflictive behavior are examined in terms of discrepancies between achieved
and expected levels of attainment (attainment gaps) on relevant needs. Two general conflict-inducing situa-
tions at the level of non-violent hostility are identified: one where the attainment gap is causally attributable
to the target of the hostility and another where such behavior might help narrow the gap even in the absence
of external attributability. Although the properties of a nation which, in the second situation, might make it
the object of another’s hostility are not well understood, some tentative suggestions are advanced to account
for this possibility. The differences in the incentives behind warfare and those that lead to simple hostility
are considered, with particular attention to the relation between specific sorts of unsatisfied needs and war
involvement. It is suggested that both the salience of certain needs and the range of strategies to enhance
attainments thereon are factors which link given needs to armed conflict; both, it is argued, are shaped by
the nature and structure of the societies within which the needs are experienced. Situations where the bene-
fits from simple hostility carry over into (or are amplified by) warfare are discussed, as are instances where
the contrary occurs. Tentative explanations for these patterns are suggested. Finally, the impact of military
capacity on the transition from hostility to warfare is examined, both from the point of view of the balance
between potential antagonists and the nature of the actual weaponry involved.
There is currently no dearth of writing and re-
search on the correlates, causes, and even
consequences, of international conflict. A fair
amount of data has been generated, statistical
correlations produced, and partial increments
to scientific knowledge claimed.’ From ab-
stract speculation guided by a combination of
historical insight and theoretical intuition, we
have moved in the direction of manifest em-
piricism. Despite the tenacity and vigor of our
efforts we seem at best to be languidly scudd-
ing toward cumulative knowledge. Research
findings and substantive understanding are
simply not moving in tandem, and it could be
that our ability to systematize these findings,
and to place them in a relevant theoretical
context, have not kept pace with the evolving
technology of research. It should not be as-
sumed that a fully developed theoretical struc-
ture must necessarily precede research. In the
absence of axiomatic observations from
which to inferentially derive analytical propo-
sitions, then to be subjected to empirical con-
firmation or disconfirmation, research and
theory building should be intertwined at every
stage. Currently, however, the former seems
to be insufficiently informed by the latter,
and what we need at this point is, at the very
least, a backdrop of useful questions, con-
cepts, and relational hypotheses, against
which the morass of extant empirical findings
could be evaluated and which might, further-
more, beneficially guide subsequent research.
I will try to make some suggestions in this vein
by focusing primarily on issues which do not
seem to have claimed sufficient attention. The
fact that some of these issues are rather ele-
mentary underscores the need to address them
more fully.
The concern here is with international con-
flict, i.e. with that class of external behavior
where efforts to impose costs on others domi-
nate attempts at achieving cooperative gains.
This need not involve armed violence, as such
costs can be imposed in various ways and im-
ply deprivations of different sorts and magni-
tudes. Let us then distinguish two categories
of international conflict: one involving armed
violence (i.e. warfare) and another where
costs are imposed short of military means
(and termed simply hostility). It may be useful
to view these as two major segments along a
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continuum of increasingly conflictive external
behavior rather than as qualitatively different
categories. While the ultimate concern here
will be with warfare, the nature of the causal
mechanisms behind the two is often not sub-
stantially different. Additional variables may
be needed to account for violence or the same
variables might have to assume values in dif-
ferent ranges, but the causes of warfare may
frequently be subsumed within those of hosti-
lity. In other words, one could not usually
provide an adequate account of the reasons
for the onset of war2 without explaining why
there would, in any case, have been hostility
but why, due to additional considerations,
conflict did in fact assume a violent form. I
will proceed accordingly. The structure of the
incentives behind conflictive behavior will be
discussed by focusing, first of all, on hostility,
and two elementary situations, associated
with quite different causal mechanisms, will
be briefly discussed. Following this, the cir-
cumstances which may lead governments to
engage in actual warfare rather than to limit
their conflict to simple hostility will be ex-
amined. In this context, the role of military
power and of the changing instruments of
warfare will be considered.
International conflict can be analyzed at a
variety of levels. One can focus on the struc-
ture of the international system and search for
roles, interactions, and ways of distributing
economic and symbolic goods which seem to
have a bearing on hostility or warfare. One
could do as much for dyads of nations or one
could place the emphasis on the goals, capabi-
lities, and habits of individual states. At an
even greater level of specificity, the interests
and power of subnational groups and institu-
tions could be subjected to intense scrutiny.
Some eclecticism is certainly possible here,
and choices will depend on the uses to which
the knowledge is to be put and on the nature
of the questions to which answers are sought.
Here we will settle for an intermediate level of
generality by making the nation-state our
principal unit of analysis. Let us begin then
with hostile behavior and attempt to get a grip
on the incentives from which it springs.
The structure of hostility
The concern here will be with purposeful for-
eign policy behavior, implying that there is a
conscious link, in the policy makers’ minds,
between the behavior and the attainment of
some desired end-state. As long as external
hostility is purposeful it is likely to stem from
some dissatisfaction’ generated by a discre-
pancy between achievements and desires i.e.,
from an attainment-gap on some need pur-
sued by the authorities who make decisions on
behalf of the nation. In addition, there must
be some perceived reason indicating that host-
ility will contribute to its reduction. A starting
point, therefore, is provided by the concept of
needs with respect to which attainment gaps
can be experienced.
At an earlier stage in the development of
the discipline, it was generally assumed that
the quest for national power, a need with
zero-sum implications and one which every
nation was to experience uniformly,4 provided
the incentive behind all international conflict.
Tautologies implied by extreme versions of
this paradigm have been adequately exposed
and, though power is clearly instrumental to
the attainment of a wide variety of ends in
foreign policy, a more nuanced view of ulti-
mate needs is called for. It is, of course, virtu-
ally impossible to provide an exhaustive in-
ventory of the goals pursued by governments
and on which foreign policies might bear. Nor
would this be a particularly useful exercise as
variations in goals exist both between societies
and within the same societies across time. At
some level of abstraction a taxonomy can
nevertheless be quite useful and a reasonable
balance between comprehensiveness and par-
simony might be provided by the following
set of five needs: (1) regime security (the stabi-
lity of the basic rules governing the polity and
society), (2) national security (safety of terri-
tory and population from external threats),
(3) the political authorities’ own continued in-
cumbency, (4) national prosperity, and, (5)
national prestige (the symbolic rewards bes-
towed on the nation from outside). These ne-
eds will never be quite independent, nor are
they all equally salient in all nations and at all
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times; nonetheless, all are likely to be impor-
tant to governments and each can, under cer-
tain conditions, be affected by external con-
flict.
By definition, the size of an attainment gap
for a nation (a) is given by:
E~: is the expected level of attainment for the
nation on need i, that which it was con-
sidered possible, and hence desirable, to
attain.
A~: is the actual level of attainment of (a) on
(i).
While the actual level of attainment is di-
rectly given, expectations can be determined
in a variety of ways depending on the sort of
referent value of attainment which is most im-
portant in establishing expectations. A fairly
large body of literature has dealt with this is-
sue and, within it, several conceptions of the
most significant such referent can be distin-
guished. While these writings are for the most
part sociological, applications to international
relations are quite straightforward.
According to one perspective, expectations
are formed on the basis of achievements of sa-
lient reference groups to which one’s own at-
tainments are compared. The larger the gap
between the two, the greater the dissatisfac-
tion and the stronger is the incentive to do
something about it. It is sometimes assumed
that the tendency to compare increases as the
overall social distance between an actor and a
prospective reference group decreases - the
implication being that important gaps are
those engendered by a failure to achieve that
which seems to be within reasonable grasp.5 In
other words, while Argentina might compare
itself to Brazil or Pakistan to India, neither
would be likely to choose a major industrial
power as a natural standard for comparison.
Another school of thought views ’status
disequilibrium’ - a lack of consistency in le-
vels of achievement on salient needs - as par-
ticularly important. A discrepancy, for ex-
ample, between prestige and prosperity could
induce a nation to seek to do better on the
need with respect to which attainments are
lagging. Occasionally, disequilibria of this
sort have been directly linked to aggressive
behavior.’
A third perspective suggests that it is past
performance which defines the trend along
which present achievements are expected to
progress. If current attainments are below the
level predicted by the trend, dissatisfaction
will ensue.’ For example, as Soviet economic
growth rates dip below the figures of previous
decades, an increasing amount of perceived
deprivation could be anticipated.
Although it is habitual in the social scien-
ces to think in terms of relative deprivation
(where the value of the referent, while given
by an explicit rule, is specific to each actor), it
should be useful to conceive of a constant re-
ferent value for all actors as well. Attainment
gaps are then no longer relative but, in terms
of measurement procedure, absolute. In this
case one would usually (though not necessar-
ily) take a zero level of attainment as a refer-
ent.~ 8
Thus there are at least four types of depri-
vation which could lead a nation to undertake
some corrective behavior. It is, however,
worth pointing out that the mere existence of
an attainment gap should not, per se, cause
hostile foreign policy behavior. All that can
be assumed, in the absence of additional con-
siderations, is that it will provide a drive to-
ward some sort of action. These policies, in
the case of the behavior of states, might be di-
rected at the domestic context without involv-
ing other nations and, even if they were in-
volved, the externally directed behavior
would not inevitably be hostile (cooperative
behavior might be more apposite to the situa-
tion). Where then are we to seek these addi-
tional considerations?
A first suggestion might be that some speci-
fic type of gap makes hostility against another
nation particularly likely. A frequent belief,
for example, is that this sort of behavior oc-
curs when the feeling of deprivation stems
from an unfavorable comparison with anoth-
er nation. While it is unlikely that invidious
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comparisons are drawn on the basis of natio-
nal and regime security or the security of the
political authorities’ own incumbency (abso-
lute attainments are what matter in these in-
stances), they could be made for economic
prosperity and prestige which can be reasona-
bly assessed only in relative terms. This would
be hostility born of simple jealousy and in-
duced by the nature of the referent used in ap-
praising performance. Still, historical instan-
ces of so simple a situation are scarce and in
many instances, perhaps most, it might be ir-
relevant whether a gap is based on a compari-
son with past performance, another nation,
discrepant attainments on different needs, or
some absolute failure. It could be argued that
the nature of the referent chosen as a standard
of achievement is less crucial to explaining
hostility than is the type of need which is in-
volved in the gap. It is this which defines the
aims and the stakes of the hostile behavior
but, despite the intuitive salience of this type
of consideration, its relevance has by no
means been established. The issue will be ad-
dressed again in the discussion of warfare
and, while there may be reason to believe that
states are more likely to engage in armed con-
flict over certain aims than over others, there
little empirical evidence, and no sound theore-
tical foundation, for believing that hostility of
a nonviolent sort is systematically related to
deprivations concerning specific needs.
It may be necessary to look further and to
cast the explanatory net outside of the gap it-
self. What might often be very significant is
whether one’s own inadequate attainments
are causally attributed to the activities of an-
other nation. If so, hostility would be the pro-
duct of resentment and the responsible party
would be its target. There may even be several
nations to whom responsibility is imputed
and, hence, multiple targets. A few examples
will illustrate this first type of drive toward ex-
ternal hostility.
A prosperous nation which is excluded
from major international councils, or denied
a symbol of national prestige (e.g., a nuclear
weapon), might feel slighted in terms of the
status to which it considers that its wealth
should entitle it. Hostility toward those held
responsible for such a situation would be a
likely response. Examples of this sort are by
no means rare. Germany’s economic growth
from the late nineteenth century to the first
decades of the twentieth was not translated
into corresponding status and a major
international role. A lack of colonies at the
beginning of the century and the humiliation
of Versailles surely go a long way toward ex-
plaining a pattern of aggressivity which pro-
duced two of history’s most destructive wars.
Economic deprivation, on the other hand,
will often generate animosity toward those
whose prosperity is being achieved at one’s
expense. The ’beggar my neighbor’ policies
associated with the depression of the thirties
bear some of the onus for the international
tension and distrust of the period.
There is, therefore, reason to assume that
the causal attributllity of attainment gaps is a
condition of international conflict and that
the spatial or temporal frequency of such be-
havior reflects the extent to which national in-
terests are perceived as incompatible. If attri-
butibility is, indeed, a fulcrum around which
commitment to hostility frequently revolves,
an understanding of perceptions of causality
should be a significant concern of peace re-
search, and one which is partly independent
of the quest for patterns of empirical causality
(i.e., those which transpire from observers’
estimates of causal regularities among events,
trends or structures). A concern with percep-
tions should by no means supplant an interest
in the objective facts of the situation, rather it
should supplement it by enlightening us not
only as to why certain nations may be made to
suffer by others, but why this will sometimes
be recognized, sometimes not, and occasio-
nally wrongly assumed. Not only would it be
useful to grasp the manner in which govern-
ments, under various circumstances, attribute
responsibility for their nation’s performance
to others, but also to understand how they
convey their perceptions, and with what ef-
fect, to the domestic environment, whose sup-
port for conflictive foreign policies must be
sought. We know surprisingly little of these
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matters, and efforts at remedying these defi-
ciencies appear scant. Still, causal accountabi-
lity for attainment gaps does not provide the
only context from which external hostility
might stem; to distinguish it from a rather dif-
ferent situation, I will call it the Type 1 situa-
tion. In this instance, both hostility and its
target are determined by the link between the
latter and the attainment gap. But hostility to-
ward another may arise, not because that na-
tion is in any way accountable for the depriva-
tion, but because such behavior might never-
theless reduce the gap due to some attribute of
the target’s. It is not the conduct of the target
which matters here so much as its nature. We
will term this a Type 2 situation and illustrate
it with an example.
According to one line of reasoning, threats
to governments can often be mitigated by in-
voking or provoking external hostility. The
idea is that attention can often be deflected
from unsolved domestic problems and a cli-
mate of solidarity with the regime and incum-
bent political authorities created. In addition,
hostility may provide the justification for an
extension of formal govermental authority.
This position, derived initially from the socio-
logical theories of Simmel and Coser’, has
found considerable acceptance among
scholars 10 and one is reminded of the advice
given by Henry IV on his deathbed to his son
on the need to ’busy giddy minds with foreign
quarrels’. But what will determine to whom
the hostility is directed in a Type 2 situation?
While the target may be blamed for a variety
of the nation’s difficulties, it would not in this
case be an accusation which its own authors
really believed. What then is most relevant to
the choice? There is a dearth of both theoreti-
cal efforts and of empirical research on this
question but at a rough and general level, and
in order to open a discussion on the topic, two
conditions for a potential target can be sugge-
sted. In the first place, it should be a nation
with which politically significant domestic
groups identify as little as possible. Otherwise
the results could be counterproductive for se-
curity - certainly for the security of the in-
cumbents and possibly for that of the regime
as well. Secondly, the butt of the hostility
should have attributes which make it suffi-
ciently salient and visible to the domestic pu-
blic. It is unlikely, in other words, that the go-
vernment of Ethiopia could create much of a
domestic impact by being bellicose to, for
example, Paraguay. Nor would it be particu-
larly useful for political authorities in, say, El
Salvador to pick a quarrel with Iran.
Thus, there are at least two general situa-
tions (identified here as Type 1 and Type 2) in
which external hostility can take root.
Though the nature of the attainment gap will
rarely, in and of itself, suffice to produce this
behavior, it may be enough that the depriva-
tion is imputable to another nation or that
some property of the target should commend
hostility as a promising path to gap reduction.
But our understanding of the process of such
imputation in the first situation, and our
grasp of the properties which must charac-
terize the target in the second situation, leave
very much room for additional thought and
research. If these matters seem obvious and
elementary then the lacunae should be all the
more glaring. Since, moreover, the structure
of the incentives behind hostility provides part
of the explanatory context needed to under-
stand warfare, our comprehension of the
most pernicious form of international hosti-
lity would benefit from such efforts. As
pointed out at the beginning of this essay, our
principal concern here is, in any case, with
this highest level of conflict.
Hostility or warfare?
Assuming that a drive to some level of con-
flict is provided by either a Type 1 or a Type 2
situation, when will it produce warfare rather
than hostility? We are not treading on entirely
virgin territory here and there is a solid body
of research dealing with the dynamics of crisis
behavior: notably with the process whereby
conflicts generate self-amplifying drives which
may push both parties further up the escala-
tory ladder than either had initially planned to
venture. However, the purpose here is not to
survey that which we know rather well but, as
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explained at the outset, to identify areas which
have been given rather short shrift by scho-
lars.
One potentially important issue concerns the
nature of the unsatisfied needs which most
powerfully impel nations to external violence
and which provide the stakes of warfare.
While we know little on this matter, much is
often vigorously claimed and, here, ideological
inclinations are often the best predictors of
opinions - with the political left emphasizing
the importance of economic goals and
conservatives typically claiming causal pri-
macy for political issues. The evidence for eit-
her point of view has proven inconclusive, a
fact which is scarcely surprising given the
functional complexity of modern societies
which makes it difficult to do as much as, say,
sort out primary and instrumental goals. The
role of various needs is, however, a matter
about which we should know considerably
more and the fundamental question is whet-
her certain needs are particulary well served
by warfare and, if so, what accounts for the
fact that they are? Let us begin with the Type
1 situation.
External attributability for attainment gaps
typically stems from the pursuit, by the tar-
get, of goals which are incompatible with
those of the other side. Warfare would then
be chosen if other ways of inducing the anta-
gonist to abandon the pursuit of the incom-
patible goals are unavailable or are considered
likely to be ineffective. Furthermore, these
goals should be of substantial importance to
both parties if they are to absorb the cost of
armed belligerence in their pursuit. Thus, the
salience of the need and the range of strategies
for enhancing attainments on it seem to be the
major factors linking certain needs to war.
Both of these considerations, moreover, are
almost certainly associated with nature and
structure of the societies within which the
needs are experienced. As the nature and
structure of societies and of their interna-
tional environment change, so do the war-
inducing needs. In sixteenth and seventeenth
century Europe, for example, conflicts were
frequently fought over religious issues. Mo-
narchical disputes and matters of territorial
control characterized warfare in the eighteen
century. In the nineteenth century, nationa-
lism inspired some major wars as did incom-
patibilities of ideology (primarily on the issue
of republican versus monarchical forms of
political organization) and of external econo-
mic interests. And so forth. Thus, while it
may be fruitless to search for a link between
certain needs and warfare independently of
social context, this link could become appa-
rent if this context were adequately taken into
account. Certain societies will generate
incompatibilities between certain goals and
pursuits rather than between others, and thus
make wars born of certain Type 1 situations
particularly likely. The relationship is no
doubt complex, and a pattern as simple as
that suggested by radical or conservative pu-
rists should not be expected, but the signifi-
cance of the issue to peace theory should be as
evident as is the paucity and shallowness of
our current knowledge on such matters.
There may be some properties of certain
needs that make warfare (rather than mere
hostility) more likely in a Type 2 situation as
well, but this too is hard to separate from the
societal context in which the need is being
pursued. For example, if an economy needed
bolstering via an expansion of public outlays
(say to compensate for lethargic public invest-
ment), while the society’s value system con-
demned governmental meddling in economic
mechanisms, the invocation of a dire military
need might be the only way of circumventing
strong ideological opposition. In other words,
there may be something about the relation be-
tween needs and societies which, in a Type 2
situation as well, might make war more likely
than would otherwise be the case. But here
our factual knowledge and theoretical under-
standing are as feeble as in the previous case -
suggesting vast, uncharted, and promising
areas into which peace research could ven-
ture.
At this point the analyst should be wary of
a potential pitfall. It is easy to assume that if
simple hostility is of some use in narrowing
attainment gaps, then armed violence (the
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higher level of conflict) should do an even bet-
ter job. This however, may be a very mistaken
assumption and a few examples should sup-
port the point.
It was suggested earlier that a government
which was faced with domestic instability
might initiate external hostility with the idea
of focusing attention elsewhere and creating a
’rally around the flag’ effect to its benefit.
Grievances would be forgotten as the public
rushed to support what appeared to be an
overriding national cause and, if this willing-
ness was not sufficiently in evidence, the aut-
horities would at least have an excuse for
tightening the reins of control at home (e.g.,
by imposing martial law). Yet, results which
could be produced by hostility short of war-
fare might, under certain circumstances, be
reversed if armed violence occurred. Substan-
tial human losses and material sacrifices could
cause a support which would have been grant-
ed a government were it merely rattling sabres
and hurling invective abroad, to be with-
drawn. In a similar vein, a nation experien-
cing severe ethnolinguistic rift could, perhaps,
alleviate the problem by generating a foreign
threat; but, with actual warfare, there is a
danger that the enemy might provide side pay-
ments to the dissatisfied group to ensure its
neutrality (and possibly even collaboration) -
thus exacerbating rather than mitigating the
cleavage.
As a second sort of example: it is some-
times claimed that market economies, left to
their own devices, would usually not manage
to generate sufficient consumer and investor
demand to match overall productive capacity
(the Keynesian’s issue of ’aggregate demand’
and the radicals’ problem of ’absorptive capa-
city’). This implies that public spending must
fill the gap, something which can be effective-
ly accomplished by military purchases which
are justified, in turn, by existing hostilities. If,
however, armed belligerence were involved,
military demand could no longer be tuned to
economic needs but would be dictated by the
dynamics and requirements of the conflict it-
self. Substantial inflationary pressures are a
typical result. Moreover, the need to maxi-
mize current production in wartime usually
means that insufficient resources will be devo-
ted to maintaining existing capital stock and
that new capital formation will be sluggish.
As military outlays increase, investments
must suffer and future economic performance
may be seriously jeopardized.
In these two examples, hostility proved far
more useful to reducing attainment gaps than
was outright warfare, but this may not always
be the case. As a third example, we might as-
sume a society whose volume of material
needs outstrips the economy’s resource base
causing various forms of deprivation. Ensu-
ing socio-political disruptions could threaten
the security of the regime and lead the govern-
ment to seek to mitigate the instability by
means of a well chosen foreign quarrel. Sim-
ple hostility might indeed produce the desired
effect, but a more substantial and long term
solution could at times be produced if access
to neeeded resources abroad was ensured by
military force;&dquo; if so, the higher level of con-
flict would yield the more beneficial effect.
The conclusion which the three examples
suggest for peace research is that more effort
should be devoted to distinguishing the effects
of the two levels of conflict, under various
conditions, on enhanced attainments. While
an extensive discussion is not within the com-
pass of this essay, certain crude hypotheses
can perhaps be drawn even on the limited ba-
sis of these examples. Specifically, if we as-
sume that simple hostility would indeed have
been beneficial, several possibilities are open
for warfare.
It may be, as in the first two examples, that
while hostility could be beneficial, its helpful
effects simply do not carry over into violent
conflict (which could actually produce highly
detrimental effects). It is worth noting that in
both instances the incentive to conflictive be-
havior, at the level of hostility as well as war-
fare, involved a Type 2 situation - one where
the target could not be considered causally
responsible for the nation’s problem. In the
third example, however, warfare could be
more useful than hostility - not by trying to
replicate or amplify the nature of the effects
56
produced by the lower level of conflict (i.e.,
pacifying the public with external disputes),
but by acquiring economic resources through
force to some other nation’s detriment (an en-
tirely different sort of enterprise). The target
of military coercion in this case could be alto-
gether distinct from the one which would have
been chosen as the object of mere hostility
and is distinguished by the incompatibility be-
tween its immediate interests and those of the
aggressor (the resources claimed by one side
are unavailable to satisfy the needs of the oth-
er). Thus, the benefits of warfare in this in-
stance are placed in the context of a Type 1 si-
tuation. Finally, and the reader can easily fur-
nish his own example, it may be that the tar-
get is accountable for the aggressor’s depriva-
tion and that this could be mitigated by either
hostility (e.g., threats) or warfare designed to
force it to cease the objectionable behavior or
to foresake the incompatible need.
What we may be discerning therefore is a
world where the payoffs from hostility will
extend to warfare as long as both levels of
conflict involve external accountability for the
gap. If, on the other hand, a Type 2 context
provides the benefits at the level of hostility,
they may not be replicated with armed violen-
ce. If this more serious form of conflict is to
be beneficial as well, the nature of the game
might have to change so as, once again, to in-
volve a Type 1 situation (as in the third ex-
ample). All of this, of course, is both roughly
reasoned and based on examples which sug-
gested themselves to the author (a fragile em-
pirical foundation for general conclusions).
My purpose, however, is to be suggestive
rather than conclusive, to nudge peace
researchers into considering these questions
with both theoretical sensitivity and scientific
rigor.
Of course, once conflictive behavior at any
level comes to dominate a nation’s foreign po-
licy, further escalation may not be a matter of
this kind of decisional calculus at all. Once
embarked upon, such behavior can assume
the form (as pointed out above, p. 43) of a
self-amplifying feedback process where the
dynamics of conflict override rational calcula-
tions of the ultimate effects of the behavior.
We grasp this rather well and have studied the
matter fairly conscientiously. However, we
should not allow our appreciation of such for-
ces to blur the possibility that decision makers
may not always be the victims of powerful dy-
namics over which they have lost control and,
if we do accept this possibility, we should also
strive to improve our understanding of the ef-
fects which different levels of conflict may
produce on significant needs.
Arms and war
No decision concerning a specific course of
action can be adequately understood solely by
considering the drives behind the contem-
plated behavior. Every activity involves cer-
tain direct and anticipated costs which will be
included in the decision makers’ reckoning -
particularly when, as in the case of warfare,
they are likely to be quite high. The extent of
these costs, moreover, is in many ways contin-
gent on the military might of the aggressor re-
lative to that of the victim, and it is here that
the concept of power is usually thought to be
most significant. To begin with, the greater
this ratio, the less the expected resistance of
the target when changes in its behavior are
sought through force. Even when one is deal-
ing with a Type 2 situation, the desired
domestic effects of warfare can be offset by
its costs (as in our first two examples in that
area) unless they are minimized by a coercive
advantage. Relative military capacity is then
one key to predicting whether the benefits of
hostility may, after all, extend to armed con-
frontations.
It could be concluded that the greater the
military advantage of the side with the con-
flictive drive, the more likely will it be to
choose the road of warfare over that of hosti-
lity. But things are less simple than this, and
the inference could frequently be misleading.
The point is that a large advantage in military
power may often render its actual exercise
unnecessary. For example, in the case of in-
compatible national interests, the more po-
werful nation may be able to get its way sim-
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ply by threats made sufficiently intimidating
by overhelming force. Thus, it may be that
neither nearly equal, nor vastly discrepant,
military power are particularly conducive to
belligerence. The first situation makes it too
risky, the second may render it superfluous. If
armed conflict should nevertheless occur un-
der conditions of near equality or vast discre-
pancy it would probably be because other
considerations (e.g., the magnitude of the at-
tainment gap) were particularly weighty for at
least one of the parties.
Despite the attention that relative capacity
has received at the hands of political scientists
and historians,12 it may not be the only rele-
vant aspect of the antagonists’ military po-
wer. Its nature may actually be more impor-
tant than the extent to which the aggregates
are balanced - particularly when this nature
reflects the ability of the weaponry to either
decrease the vulnerability of one’s own mili-
tary or civilian installations or else to increase
the vulnerability of those of the adversary. An
emphasis on the former makes the military ca-
pacity essentially defensive, an emphasis on
the latter confers an offensive character on it.
It has been historically documented that of-
fensive forces are more conducive to warfare
than are those of a defensive nature. When
offensive weaponry dominates the force po-
sture of both sides, conflict is most likely to
assume a violent form; but where both sides
take on a defensive posture the prospects for
peace are most favorable. 13 This aspect of the
issue has not been entirely neglected in the lit-
erature on peace and conflict, but it does not
seem to have been granted nearly as much at-
tention as have considerations of the concep-
tually rougher ’balance of power’ sort.
In the more recent phases of the nuclear
age, the distinction between offensive and de-
fensive weapons has been supplemented by a
distinction of a related but different kind.
While there has been some toying with the
idea of reducing national vulnerability to a
nuclear assault by, say, A.B.M.s or fallout
shelters, meaningful defenses against such a
threat have simply not evolved. While the tra-
ditional military dichotomy has found little
application in the nuclear age, a more apposi-
te distinction separates first-strike and war-
fighting weapons from those with an essenti-
ally deterrent role. These two sets of functions
are, in turn, defined by the type of target the
weapon is designed to destroy - specifically
whether this is a civilian target (e.g., an urban
area or civilian installation) or one of a predo-
minantly military character (such as a missile
silo, command post or radar). In the first
case, we would be dealing with what is termed
a countervalue weapon, in the second case it
would defined as counterforce. And, much as
the offensive or defensive nature of force po-
stures may have helped determine the like-
lihood of conventional wars, so does the
counterforce-countervalue distinction appear
to have such a function in the nuclear context.
Barring a totally depraved of demented lead-
ership, it can be assumed that the purpose of
countervalue nuclear systems is to retaliate in
the event of an attack, which implies that
their main function is to deter an assault rath-
er than to either inflict one or to ward off one
which has been undertaken. Counterforce
weapons, on the other hand, are best suited to
impose a disabling first strike or to exchange
targets in a limited nuclear conflict - i.e., to
wage rather than to deter such a war.
The first kind of function has traditionally
been central to superpower strategic doctrine
which was based on the notion that a war be-
tween the two giants could best be avoided if
each maintained the ability to absorb a first-
strike and inflict, with its remaining forces, a
level of countervalue destruction on the assai-
lant that the latter would consider unaccept-
able. Under these circumstances, neither side
would hazard an attack and peace would be
maintained through the deterrent qualities of
nuclear arsenals. Equality of military power
was less relevant to war-avoidance than was
the ability of each side to impose a specified
but unacceptable level of retaliatory destruc-
tion on the initiator of the exchange. This
was, of course, a new situation made possible
by the technology of nuclear destruction. As
George Quester has pointed out:
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In the past, one had first to defeat an enemy army
before slaughtering his people. If one had that ar-
my on the run, one could at least be assured that
no such slaughter would occur in reverse. The nu-
clear weapon delivered by airplane or rocket how-
ever lets a defeated government kill large numbers
of the enemy’s population even in the last days orhours of the was. I
Technology, however, does not stand still
and recent developments have undermined
the foundations of the traditional doctrine of
deterrence by making unacceptable retalia-
tory damage no longer inevitable for an at-
tacker. In particular, the increased accuracy
of strategic and tactical weapons, as well as
the expanding number of warheads (occasion-
ed mainly by MIRVs), have made a disabling
first-strike less and less inconceivable. Thus,
the incentive to launch a preemptive strike in
a crisis may grow and increase the likelihood
of nuclear war. IS
Among non-nuclear countries, this logic
has never applied and the offensive-defensive
dichotomy has remained quite applicable. But
as increasingly destructive technology be-
comes available to more and more nations,
the situation of the superpowers may become
quite generalized. Partly, this may be a conse-
quence of nuclear proliferation which makes
the prospect of a nuclear club with 20 or more
members by the end of the century entirely
conceivable. Not only do nuclear arms seem
destined to spread, but the means of delivering
them, quickly and accurately, could also be-
come widely available with the expanding in-
ternational transfers of modern military air-
planes, short-range rocketry, and so forth.
Neither these weapons nor the delivery vehic-
les and their guidance systems will approach
the sophistication of the hardware possessed
by the two superpowers, but the relevant tar-
gets (even those of a military sort) will in this
case be much more easily attainable. This im-
plies that the nature of military power, more
so perhaps than the extent to which it is ba-
lanced, may become a crucial determinant of
the likelihood of massive destruction. It is not
within the compass of a brief essay to delve
very deeply into the myriad issues and scena-
rios which this suggests but one, somewhat
counterintuitive, point should be made. Spe-
cifically, it seems that in a situation of parity,
greater preemptive capacity may or may not
be destabilizing. Let me explain.
Assume, for example, two nations, each of
which possesses sufficient explosive capacity
to neutralize the opponent’s ability to retaliate
if only this could be delivered, accurately, ra-
pidly, and predictably, on target. This will be
determined by what we shall call the reliability
of the two sides’ delivery systems.2‘ That of
the prospective attacker can be designated Ra,
that of the putative victim Rb; if there is pari-
ty, we can set Ra = Rb = R. Under these con-
ditions, which are not far-fetched, an increase
in reliability might either encourage or discou-
rage the initiation of warfare. This will be cla-
rified by understanding that the likelihood of
the defender’s military capacity (i.e., of his re-
taliatory arsenal) surviving an attack is (I-R)
and, if it does survive, the likelihood that it
would destroy chosen targets on the attacker’s
side is, simply, R. The overall capacity to
launch a successful retaliation will determine
the likelihood of deterrence (D) and this is gi-
ven by the function D = R(1-R), a function
which has a maximum when R equals 0.5. At
this point, therefore, the probability of a pre-
emptive strike is minimized while, below or
beyond it, it becomes increasingly likely (be-
cause the defender’s ability to retaliate dimi-
nishes on both sides of that point).
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This is but one issue and the purpose of the
exercise is merely to demonstrate that the role
of military power is more complex than might
appear at first glance. Notions of military
equilibrium remain important (different con-
clusions might have been drawn in the preced-
ing example if equal reliabilities had not been
assumed), but evolving weaponry calls for
more nuanced analyses than have been pro-
vided by traditional theories in the discipline).
Thus, not only nuclear weaponry but its hori-
zontal proliferation raise conceptual and em-
pirical issues to be more fully addressed by
peace resarch.
The current task
Despite the high hopes which were entertained
some years ago it cannot be accurately claim-
ed that we have progressed very far in under-
standing the causes, forms and implications
of international conflict. It is not so much
that we have failed to exert ourselves on be-
half of our quest but, perhaps, that in our zeal
to produce empirical findings we have al-
lowed some fundamental questions to slip out
of focus. If this assessment is correct, then the
remedy too is obvious: More effort should be
invested in building relevant theoretical foun-
dations to buttress and to guide our research.
Neither can progress very far without the oth-
er : Propositions must be put to rigorous em-
pirical tests, yet the better the propositions
the more instructive will be the tests. The sta-
tus of our theoretical achievements is such
that we are somewhat disoriented; neverthe-
less, there are several potentially fruitful
points of departure. My own judgement, as in-
dicated in this essay, is that at least three sets
of issues need additional work. The first in-
volves the structure of incentives behind con-
flictive behavior; starting with the level of
simple hostility. Special attention would be
devoted hereto the nature and implications of
the situations which I have, for lack for a
more imaginative terminology, identified as
Type 1 and Type 2. The second area would
concern the set of conditions under which in-
centives to conflictive behavior yield warfare
rather than more hostility. The effect of the
type of situation which characterizes an at-
tainment gap and the respective rewards pro-
duced by either level of conflict should, in
particular, be adequately understood. Finally,
the role of the evolving nature of military po-
wer in determining the probability of war
must be traced in greater detail. Peace rese-
arch as a discipline is not disintegrating; it is,
however stultified and an infusion of concep-
tual vigor seems the appropriate remedy.
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